Void or Inexistent Contracts

A void contract, also known as a void agreement, is not actually a contract. A void contract cannot be enforced by law. Void contracts are different from voidable contracts, which are contracts may be (but not necessarily will be) nullified.

An agreement to carry out an illegal act is an example of a void contract or void agreement. For example, a contract between drug dealers and buyers is a void contract simply because the terms of the contract are illegal. In such a case, neither party can go to court to enforce the contract, although some drug users mistakenly believe the opposite, and therefore take their disputes to court.

Lack of Essential Elements

Inexistent and void contracts cannot be ratified neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived, they are the following:

1.      Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;

2.      Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

3.      Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

4.      Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;

5.      Those which contemplate an impossible service;

6.      Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract cannot be ascertained;

6.1.   This relates to Indeterminate object under Article 1349 of the New Civil Code which states;

“The object of  every contract must be determinate as to its kind. The fact that the quantity is not determinate shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided it is possible to determine the same, without the need of a new contract between the parties.”

7.      Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.

Prohibited Contracts

This relates to the following persons who cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another under article 1491 paragraph four (4) and five (5) of the New Civil Code which states;

”Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation , or institution, the administration of which has been entrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale;”

”Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.”

What is it to be filed in court?

In order to follow the rules of law regarding void or inexistent contract, the action to be filed in court is an “Action for the Declaration of Nullity”.

According to Article 1410 of the New Civil Code:

“The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.”

However, it does not apply to last will and testaments.

How Illegal Contracts with Criminal Offense should be treated?

      Article 1411 of the New Civil Code states:

“When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitute a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract.

This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one may claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.”

The rule mentioned in the above second paragraph of Article 1411 of the New Civil Code is related to Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code which states:

“Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime: Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall by destroyed.”

How Illegal Contracts without Criminal Offense should be treated?

      Article 1412 of the New Civil Code states:

      “If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:

1.      When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking;

2.      When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not a fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise.”

No Consideration: Restitution after Void Contracts (pp 195-234)

Those who transfer value under void contracts have no remedy in contract and little to expect from the law of property, since nullity does not in general prevent property passing. However, it has been recently held in litigation following void interest swaps that the value transferred under a void contract, because it passes for ‘no consideration’, becomes an unjust enrichment of the recipient at the transferor’s expense, so that restitution must follow even where the void contract has been fully executed on both sides.

Restitution for ‘no consideration’ is alien to the law of unjust enrichment in the common law. In particular:

(i)                  Parties to a fully executed contract, though it be void, have no substantial reason for restitution;

(ii)                ‘Failure of consideration’, property understood, can explain all cases of restitution where the defendant has not completed his part;

(iii)               Cases advanced as warranting a new ground for restitution, called ‘no consideration’ and distinct from failure of consideration, turn out on closer inspection not to go beyond failure of consideration;

(iv)              The new doctrine creates an unacceptable discontinuity with the past, unsettling the foundations on which leading cases have been argued and decided, departing from the previous treatment of void contracts and contradicting the leading treatise on restitution.

These arguments notwithstanding, it will be true that in a jurisdiction which allows restitution for mistake of law, the results illegitimately attained through ‘no consideration’ will be largely attainable through mistake.

Nevertheless, the further progress of ‘no consideration’ should be resisted because it constitutes a standing invitation to borrow the language of civilian systems (‘sine causes’, ‘sans cause’, ‘ohne Rechtsgrund’), and civilian terminology can only do harm if it is imported without civilian substance.

Related Links

• http://www.answers.com/topic/void-contract
• http://www.lawreview.law.uwa.edu.au/law_review/contents/law_review_vol_23(2)
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Void_%28law%29
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Void_contract

What is an Unenforceable Contract?

An unenforceable contract or transaction is one that is valid, but which the court will not enforce. Unenforceable is usually used in contradistinction to void (or void ab initio) and voidable. If the parties perform the agreement, it will be valid, but the court will not compel them if they do not.

What are Unauthorized Contracts?

1. Those entered into in the name of another person by one, who has been given no authority or legal representation or who has acted beyond his powers;
2. Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds
3. Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
   1. If only one party is incapable, this will fall under Voidable Contract under Article 1390, paragraph 1.

The case of Badillo vs. Ferrer, 152 SCRA 407

Article 1390 renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party’s consent is vitated by mistake, voilence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

Surviving widow has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in conveying to the vendees the undivided share of her minor children in the property, as her powers as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot include the power of disposition, and she should have first secured court approval before alienation of the property.

Since the minors never ratified the deed, and in fact questioned its validity, the contract remained unenforceable or unauthorized, and restitution by the minors as to the portion of the purchase price which pertains to their share is not legally sanctioned.

Statute of Frauds defined (Article 1403, paragraph 2)

Statute of Frauds requires that certain contracts be in writing, and that they be signed by all parties to be bound by the contract. Although there can be significant variation between jurisdictions, the most common types of contracts to which a statute of fraud applies is:

·        Contracts in consideration of marriage.

·        Contracts which cannot be performed within one year.

·        Contracts for the sale of an interest in land.

·        Contracts by the executor of a will to pay a debt of the estate with his own money.

·        Contracts for the sale of goods above a certain value.

·        Contracts in which one party becomes a surety (acts as guarantor) for another party’s debt or other obligation.

Law students often remember these circumstances by the mnemonic “MYLEGS” (marriage, year, land, executor, goods, surety).

The case of Diwa vs. Donato, 234 SCRA 608

It is settled that the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory and not to completed, executed or partially executed contracts. Thus as early as 1925, we held that where the land has been delivered under the oral contract of sale, and the vendees have already paid part of the purchase price, the heirs of the vendor cannot invoke the status of frauds in a proceeding where the vendees seek to have the land registered in their names.

Agreements for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable by action unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing and subscribed by the part charged or by his agent. Non-compliance with this provision, while not invalidating the contract which is not in writing, makes ineffective the action for specific performance.

How to satisfy the requirements?

Typically, to satisfy the requirements of the statute, the writing must identify the contracting parties, recite the subject matter of the contract such that it can reasonably be identified, and present the essential terms and conditions of the parties’ agreement. (Under the Uniform Commercial Code, to satisfy the statute, the writing for the sale of goods need only be signed by the party to be charged, and a quantity term.)

Please note that, even without respect to the Statute of Frauds, it is good practice to reduce the essential terms of any contract to a signed, written agreement. Even when a Statute of Frauds does not apply to an oral contract, it may be very difficult to prove and enforce the contract in the absence of a written agreement.

The purpose of Statute of Frauds

The purpose of a “statute of frauds” is, as the name suggests, to prevent injury from fraudulent conduct. There is some criticism of the continued existence of these statutes, as they are often used by parties who freely entered into fair contracts yet wish to avoid having to fulfill their agreements. At the same time, the abuses these statutes were designed to prevent are quite real, so a strong argument remains to keep them in place. It is also arguably good public policy to require that parties to certain significant transactions, such as those of long duration or which involve real estate, reduce their agreements to writing. Writing will both reduce the chance of future litigation, and also give the parties the opportunity to take a second look at the terms and conditions of their agreement before it becomes final.

The Effect of a Statute of Frauds

A statute of frauds does not of itself render a contract void. The statute makes certain contracts “voidable” by one of the parties, in the event that the party does not wish to follow through on the agreement. (A contract that is “void” cannot be enforced. A contract that is “voidable” remains valid unless one of the parties chooses to void the contract.)

Sometimes, a party to a contract that would otherwise be invalid under a “statute of frauds” will nonetheless be able to enforce it, on the basis of “partial performance” or “promissory estoppel”. Where “partial performance” exists, a party who has accepted partial performance by another party under the contract will typically be barred from asserting the “Statute of Frauds” in order to avoid meeting its own contractual obligations. “Promissory estoppel” exists where significant inequities (unfairness) would result from releasing a party from the contract, and the party seeking release knew or reasonably should have known that those inequities would be created at the time of the original agreement. For example, where the party which seeks to be released knew that the other party would incur significant expense in obtaining materials which cannot be transferred to other work, a court may find that under the circumstances the contract should be enforced despite the statute of frauds.

As previously noted, if all parties agree that they are bound by the contract, the contract will remain enforceable despite the statute of frauds.

Exceptions in applying Statute of Frauds

An agreement may be enforced even if it does not comply with the statute of frauds in the following situations:

·        Merchant’s Firm Offer, under the UCC. If one merchant sends a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds to another merchant, the merchant has reason to know of the contents of the sent confirmation and the receivor does not object to the confirmation within 10 days, the confirmation is good to satisfy the statute as to both parties.

·        Admission of the existence of a contract by the defendant under oath,

·        Part Performance of the contract. The agreement is enforceable up to the amount already paid, delivered, etc.

·        The goods were specially manufactured for the buyer and the seller either 1) began manufacturing them, or 2) entered into a third party contract for their manufacture, and the manufacturer cannot without undue burden sell the goods to another person in the seller’s ordinary course of business– for example, t-shirts with a baseball team logo or wall-to-wall carpeting for an odd-sized room.

Parole Evidence Rule defined

The parole evidence rule enacts a principle of the common law of contracts that presumes that a written contract embodies the complete agreement between the parties involved. The rule therefore generally forbids the introduction of extrinsic evidence (i.e., evidence of communications between the parties which is not contained in the language of the contract itself) which would change the terms of a later written contract.

In order for the rule to be effective, the contract in question must be an integrated writing; it must, in the judgment of the court, be the final agreement between the parties (as opposed to a mere draft, for example). One way to ensure that the contract will be found integration is through the inclusion of a merger clause, which recites that the contract is, in fact, the whole agreement between the parties. However, many modern cases have found merger clauses to be only a rebuttable presumption.

An integrated agreement is either a partial or complete integration. If it contains some, but not all, of the terms as to which the parties have agreed then it is a partial integration. This means that the writing was a final agreement between the parties (and not mere preliminary negotiations) as to some terms, but not as to others. On the other hand, if the writing were to contain all of the terms as to which the parties agreed, then it would be a complete integration. The importance of this distinction is relevant to what evidence is excluded under the parole evidence rule. For both complete and partial integrations, any evidence contradicting the writing is excluded under the parole evidence rule. However, for a partial integration, terms that do not contradict the writing but merely add to it are not excluded.

Exceptions in applying Parole Evidence Rule

There are a number of exceptions to the parole evidence rule. Extrinsic evidence can always be admitted for the following purposes:

·        To work out the subject matter of the contract.

·        To resolve an ambiguity in the contract.[1]

·        To show that an unambiguous term in the contract is in fact a mistaken transcription of a prior valid agreement. Such a claim must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and not merely by the preponderance of the evidence.

·        To show fraud, duress, mistake, or illegal purpose on the part of one or both parties.

·        To show that consideration has not actually been paid. For example, if the contract states that A has paid B $1,000 in exchange for a painting, B can introduce evidence that A had never actually conveyed the $1,000.

·        To identify the parties, especially if the parties have changed names.

·        To imply or incorporate a term of the contract.

In order for evidence to fall within this rule, it must involve either (1) a written or oral communication made prior to execution of the written contract; or (2) an oral communication made contemporaneous with execution of the written contract. Evidence of a later communication will not be barred by this rule, as it is admissible to show a later modification of the contract (although it might be inadmissible for some other reason, such as the Statute of Frauds. Similarly, evidence of a collateral agreement – one that would naturally and normally be included in a separate writing – will not be barred. For example, if A contracts with B to paint B’s house for $1,000, B can introduce extrinsic evidence to show that A also contracted to paint B’s storage shed for $100. The agreement to paint the shed would logically be in a separate document from the agreement to paint the house.

Though its name suggests that it is a procedural evidence rule, the consensus of courts and commentators is that the parole evidence rule constitutes substantive contract law.

Reference Links

·        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unenforceable

·        http://homepage.gallaudet.edu/Marshall.Wick/BUS447/unenforceable.html

·        http://www.textop.org/wiki/index.php?title=Unenforceable_contracts_and_contracts_in_the_state_of_nature

·        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_frauds

·        http://www.expertlaw.com/library/business/statute_of_frauds.html

·        http://www.west.net/~smith/frauds.htm

The right of a man to worship God in his own view is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights under Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which states that:

“No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exervise and enjoyment of religious profession and whoship, without discrimniation or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be requires for the exercise of civil or political rights.”

Restriction by any law in exercising this right is prohibited by the Constitution itself.

Meaning of religion
According to Concise Oxford Dictionary, religion is the belief in and worship of a superhuman controlling power, especially a personal God or gods. a particular system of faith and worship. a pursuit or interest followed with devotion.

Aspects of religions freedom

1. The separation of Church and State
2. The freedom of religious profession and worship
   1. Freedom to believe in a religion
   2. Freedom to act in accordance with such belief

To believe and Act
Thus the (First) amendment embraces two concepts – freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be… In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same to action. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.

Justice Teenhankee says:

1. The right to freely exercise one’s religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. (footnote omitted) Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly “along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary – even more so than on the other departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.’ (J.B.L. Reyes, 125 SCRA at pp. 569-570)
2. In the free exercise of such preferred rights, there is to be no prior restraint although there may be subsequent punishment of any illegal acts committed during the exercise of such basic rights. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of these basic rights is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent (Idem, at pp. 560-561).

The establishment clause
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one’s chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. (footnote omitted). Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 L ed. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449)

Justice Laurel says:
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims . . . It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere toleration.

Establishment Clause versus Free Exercise Clause
Tension is also apparent when a case is decided to uphold the Free Exercise Clause and consequently exemptions from a law of general applicability are afforded by the Court to the person claiming religious freedom; the question arises whether the exemption does not amount to support of the religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. This was the case in the Free Exercise Clause case of Sherbert where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, viz:

In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the “establishment” of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.371 (emphasis supplied)

Tension also exists when a law of general application provides exemption in order to uphold free exercise as in the Walz case where the appellant argued that the exemption granted to religious organizations, in effect, required him to contribute to religious bodies in violation of the Establishment Clause. But the Court held that the exemption was not a case of establishing religion but merely upholding the Free Exercise Clause by “sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on private profit institutions.

How the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause will be resolved is a question for determination in the actual cases that come to the Court. In cases involving both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, the two clauses should be balanced against each other. The courts must review all the relevant facts and determine whether there is a sufficiently strong free exercise right that should prevail over the Establishment Clause problem. In the United States, it has been proposed that in balancing, the free exercise claim must be given an edge not only because of abundant historical evidence in the colonial and early national period of the United States that the free exercise principle long antedated any broad-based support of disestablishment, but also because an Establishment Clause concern raised by merely accommodating a citizen’s free exercise of religion seems far less dangerous to the republic than pure establishment cases. Each time the courts side with the Establishment Clause in cases involving tension between the two religion clauses, the courts convey a message of hostility to the religion that in that case cannot be freely exercised.374 American professor of constitutional law, Laurence Tribe, similarly suggests that the free exercise principle “should be dominant in any conflict with the anti-establishment principle.” This dominance would be the result of commitment to religious tolerance instead of “thwarting at all costs even the faintest appearance of establishment.”375 In our jurisdiction, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. asserts that a literal interpretation of the religion clauses does not suffice. Modern society is characterized by the expanding regulatory arm of government that reaches a variety of areas of human conduct and an expanding concept of religion. To adequately meet the demands of this modern society, the societal values the religion clauses are intended to protect must be considered in their interpretation and resolution of the tension. This, in fact, has been the approach followed by the Philippine Courts.

Religious Devotion
Anent the representation that attendance to religious devotion is not a “cut” in public service alleging that people of Muslim faith can accomplish many good deeds outside office such as promotion of unity, peace and understanding among the people must similarly be rejected. The theory is that a religious belief by itself cannot in any degree affect public interest (Textbook on the Philippine Constitution, Hector SCRA De Leon, 1991 Edition). The promotion of unity, peace and understanding is a right accompanying the right to religion as it partakes the form of the right to dissemination of belief. Additionally, the exercise of religious profession and worship is obviously alien to performance of work considering that the former is a cleric activity and the latter is secular one.

Freedom not to associate
(Republic Act No. 3350) was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. . . . The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs, and . . . eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment.

A fundamental personal right and liberty
Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty (Schneider v. Irgington, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 84 L.ed.155, 164, 60 S.Ct. 146) and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary.

Right, not absolute
More importantly, the right to act in accordance with one’s belief is not and cannot be absolute. Conduct remains subject to regulation and even prohibition for the protection of society (Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U.SCRA 296). It may not be used to justify an action or refusal inconsistent with general welfare of society (People vs. Diel, [CA] 44 O.G. 590, August 22, 1947). One of the regulations imposed in its exercise is the compliance of government employees to Section 5 of the Omnibus Rules relative to the number of working hours. While government employees of Muslim faith are excused from work between the hours of 10 o’clock in the morning up to 2 o’clock in the afternoon every Friday, they are obligated to compensate said lost working hours by adopting flexible time schedule to complete forty hours of work in a week.

Church versus State
We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah’s Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a ’small portion of the school population’ will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation ‘untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes’ (Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 224). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of ‘patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation of national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values’ (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court has feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.

Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, x x x- assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion- is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.

It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some ‘compelling state interest’ intervenes.

Related Cases

• Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2
• Everson vs. Board of Education, 330 U. SCRA 1
• West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U. SCRA 624
• Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, March 1, 1993
• Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201
• Centeno vs. Villalon, 236 SCRA 197
• Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. SCRA 569
• Fonacier vs. CA, 96 Phil. 417
• Garces vs. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510
• German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514
• Gonzales vs. Archbishop of Manila, 51 Phil. 420
• Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc. vs. CA, July 26, 1996
• Marsh vs. State of Alabama, 326 U. SCRA 501
• Pamil vs. Teleron, 86 SCRA 413
• People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
• School District of Abington Township, Pa. vs. Schempp, 374 U. SCRA 203
• Engle vs. Vitale, 370 U.SCRA 421; 8 L. ed. 2d. 601
• Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
• Zorach vs. Clauson, 343 U. SCRA 306
• Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U. SCRA 296
• Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 657
• Pastor Dionisio V. Austria vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999
• Estrada vs. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

External Resources and Credits

• Textbook on the Philippine Constitution by Hector S. De Leon
• International Center of Law and Religious Studies – http://www.iclrs.org/
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_religion
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_of_church_and_state
• http://www.csc.gov.ph/mread02/res-020720.html