Matalin Coconut Co. vs Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao Del Sur, GR No. L-28138, August 13, 1986

-        In an action for declaratory relief assailing the validity of a municipal tax ordinance, the court, in deciding that the ordinance is void, is authorized to require a refund oftaxes paid there under without the necessity of converting the proceeding into an ordinary action there having been no alleged violation yet.

-        A fixed tax denominatd as a “police inspection fee” of P0.30 per sack of cassava starch shipped out of the municipality is VOID where it is not for public purpose, just and uniform because the police do nothing but count the number of cassava sacks shipped out.

-        Inspection fee should not be excessive and confiscatory

-        The power to regulate as an exercise of police power does not include the power to impose fees for revenue purposes.

-        Fees for purely regulatory purposes must be no more sufficient to cover the actual cost of inspection and examination as nearly as the same can be estimated.

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties, Inc, GR No. 111097, July 20, 1994

-        Tests of a valid ordinance – to be valid, it must conform to the following substantive requirements

• It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.
• It must not be unfair or oppressive.
• It must not be partial or discriminatory.
• It must not prohibit but regulate trade.
• It must not be unreasonable.
• It must be general and consistent with public policy.
• MNEMONIC: CUP PUG

-        The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious as municipal governments are ONLY AGENTS of the national government and that the delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

-        Implied repeals – it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention.

-        A contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution.

Tatel vs Municipality of Virac, GR No. 40243, March 11, 1992

-        Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.

-        Role of a local agency unit and tests of a valid ordinance was discussed here as well.

City of Cebu vs CA, GR No. 109173, July 5, 1996

-        A Local Government Unit may, through its Chief Executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain x x x provided, however, that the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and efinite offer has been previously made to the owner and as such offer was not accepted.

-        RA 7160, Section 19. Eminent Domain

• General Rule: Upon payment of just compensation
• Provided, however – a valid and definite offer has been made previously to the owner.
• Provided, further – LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon filing of the expropriation proceedings AND upon making a deposity with the propert court of at least 15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated.
• Provided, finally – Such amount shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Dacanay vs Asistio, Jr., 208 SCRA 404

-        The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through a contract.

-        Executive Order may not infringe upon vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve.

Macasiano vs. Diokno, Gr No. 97764, August 10, 1992

-        Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.

-        Properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of men and cannot be disposed of or leased by the LGU to private persons.

-        Roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use.

Erwin Javellana vs DILG, GR No. 102549

-        Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities. Why? Because it is presumed that they are knowledgeable and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction.

-        It is prohibited for a government official to engage in private practice of his profession IF such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. 328 SCRA 836

• Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.
• Police power is lodged primarily in Congress which may delegate the power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or LGU.
• Local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.
• Police power is delegated to LGU. This delegation is known as the general welfare clause.

• LGUs exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
  • Sangguniang Panlalawigan -> Provincial government
  • Sangguniang Panlungsod -> City government
  • Sangguniang Bayan -> Municipal government
  • Sangguniang Barangay -> Barangay
  • Above legislative bodies has the power to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of their jurisdiction and its inhabitants and in the proper exercise of corporate powers of the same.
• Nothing was found in RA 7924 which grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
• MMDA is not a political unit of government unlike with Metro Manila Council which has the power to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of MMDA’s functions.
• MMDA is not a LGU or public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a ‘special metropolitan political subdivision’ as contemplated in Constitution, Sec 11, Art X.
  • The creation of special metropolitan political subdivision requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in political units directly affected.
  • The Chairman of MMDS is not even an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
  • Unlike MMC, MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

Lina vs Dizon Pano (GR 129093) – This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.

In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress.

Chus, Sr. vs Benilda Estate Corporation – A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.⁶ The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof.⁷

Alvarez vs Guingona – In this regard, we hold that petitioners’ asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.

It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.¹ Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.²

Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government system.

A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.³Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,⁴ the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.⁵ Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with their oWn resources and assets.⁶

The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions.⁷ Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.^8.

Cordillera Broad Coalition vs CA (GR 79956) – the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.

It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority

Batangas CATV Inc vs CA (GR 138810) – Under cover of the General Welfare Clause as provided in this section, Local Government Units can perform just about any power that will benefit their constituencies.  Thus, local government units can exercise powers that are: (1) expressly granted; (2) necessarily implied from the power that is expressly granted; (3) necessary, appropriate or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and (4) essential to the promotion of the general welfare of their inhabitants. (Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991, p. 46)

The grant of regulatory power to the NTC is easily understandable.  CATV system is not a mere local concern.  The complexities that characterize this new technology demand that it be regulated by a specialized agency.  This is particularly true in the area of rate-fixing.  Rate fixing involves a series of technical operations.^[48] Consequently, on the hands of the regulatory body lies the ample discretion in the choice of such rational processes as might be appropriate to the solution of its highly complicated and technical problems.  Considering that the CATV industry is so technical a field, we believe that the NTC, a specialized agency, is in a better position than the LGU, to regulate it.

Speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States vs. Abendan,^[37] Justice Moreland said: “An ordinance enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right.”  In De la Cruz vs. Paraz,^[38] we laid the general rule “that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.”

League of Cities of the Philippines vs COMELEC (GR 176951, 177499, 178056) – we should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the expense of the transcendental interest of justice and equity. While it is true that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler rather for this Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and doubt, as the following pronouncement of this Court instructs:

The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution x x x, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.¹⁸

Municipal Liability

1. Palafox vs Province of Ilocos Norte – Municipality is not liable if it performs governmental functions except if there is a law permitting it.
2. Torio vs Fontanilla – Municipality is liable if it performs in proprietary functions (i.e. holding a town fiesta) and therefore liable to third persons under the law of contracts or torts.
3. Province of Cebu vs IAC – The doctrine of implied municipal liability has been said to apply to all cases where money or other property of a party is received under such circumstances that the general law, independent of express contract implies an obligation upon the municipality to do justice with respect to the same.”
4. Osmena vs COA (GR 98355) – Quantum Meruit is based on justice and equity, to compensate a property or benefit received if restitution is equitable and if such action involves no violation, frustration or opposition to public policy.
5. Osmena vs COA (GR 110045) – That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure, particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, ¹⁷ it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, ¹⁸ as well as the obligation to pay just and valid claims against it.
6. Ramos vs CA (GR 99425) – Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. Law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province. Only accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expanded to hire private lawyers.

Qualifications & Election of Elective Local Officials

1. Borja Jr. vs COMELEC (GR 133495) – In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. In the case before the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the position of Mayor in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for the unexpired term of his predecessor. Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one (1) term for purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
2. Romualdez vs RTC (GR 104960) – In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: “(t)he term “residence” as used in the election law is synonymous with “domicile”, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.”
3. Rodriguez vs COMELEC (GR 120099) – Art. 73. Disqualifications. — The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. (Emphasis supplied).
4. Frivaldo vs COMELEC (257 SCRA 727) – the Local Government Code speaks of “Qualifications” of “ELECTIVE OFFICIALS,” not of candidates. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.

Vacancies and Succession

1. Farinas vs Barba (GR 116763) – Where there is no political party to make a nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy occurs, must be considered the appropriate authority for making the recommendation, by analogy to vacancies created in the Sangguniang Barangay whose members are by law prohibited from having any party affiliation.
2. Victoria vs COMELEC (GR 109005) – The ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the total number of registered voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
3. Gamboa Jr. vs Aguirre (GR 134213) – Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. ¹⁹ Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy.

Local Legislation

1. Magtajas vs Pryce Properties Inc (GR 111097) – The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
2. Moday vs CA (GR 107916) – The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be
   observed. ²² The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, ²³ has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. ²⁴ Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
3. SJS vs Atienza, Jr. (GR 156052) – Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack²⁵ on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

Disciplinary Actions

1. Salalima et al vs Guingona (GR 11589-92) – We agree with the petitioners that Governor Salalima could no longer be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5450 in connection with the negotiated contract entered into on 6 March 1992 with RYU Construction for additional rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public Market.  Nor could the petitioners be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5469 for the execution in November 1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This is so because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. Such a rule is not only founded on the theory that an official’s reelection expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during his previous term.  We may add that sound public policy dictates it.  To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between the reelected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts, alleged to have been committed during his previous term.  His second term may thus be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of public service.  This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot, however, apply to criminal acts which the reelected official may have committed during his previous term.

1. The City of Angeles, Hon. Antonio Abad Santos vs CA (GR 97882) – But the end never justifies the means, and however laudable the purpose of the construction in question, this Court cannot and will not countenance an outright and continuing violation of the laws of the land, especially when committed by public officials.I

In theory, the cost of such demolition, and the reimbursement of the public funds expended in the construction thereof, should be borne by the officials of the City Angeles who ordered and directed such construction. This Court has time and again ruled that public officials are not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from acts done in bad faith. Otherwise stated, a public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. ²⁰  Indisputably, said public officials acted beyond the scope of their authority and jurisdiction and with evident bad faith. However, as noted by the trial court ²¹, the petitioners mayor and members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Angeles City were sued only in their official capacities, hence, they could not be held personally liable without first giving them their day in court. Prevailing jurisprudence ²² holding that public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official and personal capacities.

Recall

1. Angabung vs COMELEC (GR 126576) – In the instant case, this court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly repugnant to the applicable law and no less such to the spirit underlying that law. Private respondent who is a lawyer, knows that Section 69 (d) of the Local Government Code plainly provides that recall is validly initiated by a petition of 25% of the total number of registered voters. Notwithstanding such awareness, private respondent proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership of petitioner. But the petition does not bear the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private respondent is truly earnest in her cause, and the very fact that she affixed her name in the petition shows that she claims responsibility for the seeming affront to petitioner’s continuance in office. But the same cannot be said of all the other people whom private respondent claims to have sentiments similar to hers. While the people are vested with the power to recall their elected officials, the same power is accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see through all the consequences of the exercise of such power, including rising above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be recalled, his family, his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate end. The procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting the public which may have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in the performance of the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an attempt to go around the law. We can not and must not, under any and all circumstances, countenance a circumvention of the explicit 25% minimum voter requirement in the initiation of the recall process.

1. Malonzo vs COMELEC (GR 127066) – The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there was a session held. Attendees constitute the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Assembly, as we shall later on establish. Rules of procedure, simple they may be were formulated. Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which was that of petitioner’s recall. The members were given the opportunity to articulate on their resolve about the matter. More importantly, their sentiments were expressed through their votes signified by their signatures and thumbmarks affixed to the Resolution. No proof was adduced by Petitioner to substantiate his claim that the signatures appearing thereon represented a cause other than that of adopting the resolution. The law on recall did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding. Neither did it demand a specific procedure. What is fundamental is compliance with the provision that there should be a session called for the purpose of initiating recall proceedings, attended by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly, in a public place and that the resolution resulting from such assembly be adopted by a majority of all the PRA members.

Human Resources and Development

1.      Javellana vs DILG (GR 102549) – In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

 2.      Tobias vs Hon. Benjamin Abalos (GR 114783) – Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city-one representative” proviso in the Constitution:

. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).

Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.

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Download Local-Government-Code-Reviewer-based-on-Atty Fragante-Syllabus PDF version here. (subject for update later)

It is also called as the Local Government Code of the Philippines

Declaration of Policy (See RA 7160, Sec 2)

1. To enjoy local autonomy to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
2. To ensure accountability of local government units (aka LGUs).
3. To conduct periodic consultations with appropriate LGUs.

What is Decentralization? (See RA 7160, Sec 3)

• To allocate different LGUs of theor respective powers, functions, responsibilities and resources.
• To have an accountable, efficient and ynamic organizaitonal structure.
• To further improve the performance of LGUs and the quality of community life.

In case of doubt in the interpretation of Local Government Code, who shall prevail? (See RA 7160, Sec 5)

• Any provisions in LGUs shall be interpreted in its favor. In case of doubt, it shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower LGUs. In case of existence of power, it shall be interpreted in favor of LGU concerned.
• Any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly against the LGU enacting it.
• For general welfare provisions, it shall be interpreted as to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.
• In rights, contracts and obligations, it shall be governed by its terms and conditions.
• If no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, customs and traditions in the place where the controversies will take place.

Who has the power to create LGUs? (See RA 7160, Sec 6)

• Law enacted by Congress for province, city, municipality or any other political subdivision (i.e. DPWH, DTI)
• Ordinance passed by provincial or city council for barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction.
• All subject to limitations and requirements prescribed in this code (i.e. income, population and territory requirements)

What are the indicators before a LGU may be created? (See RA 7160, Sec 7)

• A sufficient income.
• Total number of inhabitants or population.
• Land areamust be contiguous.
  • If it comprises two or more islands OR separated by a LGU independent of the others, it shall be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and it should be sufficient to support its people.
• All indicators shall be attested by DOF, NSO and LMB, attached agency of DENR.

How does the division and merger of an LGU applies? (See RA 7160, Sec 8)

• It should comply with requirements in RA 7160, Sec 7.
• It should not reduce the IPT (Income, Population & Territory) of the LGU/s to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this code.
• Income classification should not fall below its current income classification prior to such division.

How to abolish a LGU? (See RA 7160, Sec 9)

• When its income, population or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its created under Book III (Barangay, Municipality, City, Province), as certified by the Congress or Sanggunian concerned, as the case may be.
• Law or ordinance should be passed when abolishing a LGU.
• Abolishing an LGU may also have the meaning as being merged or incorporated into an existing one.

A void contract, also known as a void agreement, is not actually a contract. A void contract cannot be enforced by law. Void contracts are different from voidable contracts, which are contracts may be (but not necessarily will be) nullified.

An agreement to carry out an illegal act is an example of a void contract or void agreement. For example, a contract between drug dealers and buyers is a void contract simply because the terms of the contract are illegal. In such a case, neither party can go to court to enforce the contract, although some drug users mistakenly believe the opposite, and therefore take their disputes to court.

Lack of Essential Elements

Inexistent and void contracts cannot be ratified neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived, they are the following:

1.      Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;

2.      Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

3.      Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

4.      Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;

5.      Those which contemplate an impossible service;

6.      Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract cannot be ascertained;

6.1.   This relates to Indeterminate object under Article 1349 of the New Civil Code which states;

“The object of  every contract must be determinate as to its kind. The fact that the quantity is not determinate shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided it is possible to determine the same, without the need of a new contract between the parties.”

7.      Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.

Prohibited Contracts

This relates to the following persons who cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another under article 1491 paragraph four (4) and five (5) of the New Civil Code which states;

”Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation , or institution, the administration of which has been entrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale;”

”Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.”

What is it to be filed in court?

In order to follow the rules of law regarding void or inexistent contract, the action to be filed in court is an “Action for the Declaration of Nullity”.

According to Article 1410 of the New Civil Code:

“The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.”

However, it does not apply to last will and testaments.

How Illegal Contracts with Criminal Offense should be treated?

      Article 1411 of the New Civil Code states:

“When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitute a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract.

This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one may claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.”

The rule mentioned in the above second paragraph of Article 1411 of the New Civil Code is related to Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code which states:

“Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime: Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall by destroyed.”

How Illegal Contracts without Criminal Offense should be treated?

      Article 1412 of the New Civil Code states:

      “If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:

1.      When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking;

2.      When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not a fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise.”

No Consideration: Restitution after Void Contracts (pp 195-234)

Those who transfer value under void contracts have no remedy in contract and little to expect from the law of property, since nullity does not in general prevent property passing. However, it has been recently held in litigation following void interest swaps that the value transferred under a void contract, because it passes for ‘no consideration’, becomes an unjust enrichment of the recipient at the transferor’s expense, so that restitution must follow even where the void contract has been fully executed on both sides.

Restitution for ‘no consideration’ is alien to the law of unjust enrichment in the common law. In particular:

(i)                  Parties to a fully executed contract, though it be void, have no substantial reason for restitution;

(ii)                ‘Failure of consideration’, property understood, can explain all cases of restitution where the defendant has not completed his part;

(iii)               Cases advanced as warranting a new ground for restitution, called ‘no consideration’ and distinct from failure of consideration, turn out on closer inspection not to go beyond failure of consideration;

(iv)              The new doctrine creates an unacceptable discontinuity with the past, unsettling the foundations on which leading cases have been argued and decided, departing from the previous treatment of void contracts and contradicting the leading treatise on restitution.

These arguments notwithstanding, it will be true that in a jurisdiction which allows restitution for mistake of law, the results illegitimately attained through ‘no consideration’ will be largely attainable through mistake.

Nevertheless, the further progress of ‘no consideration’ should be resisted because it constitutes a standing invitation to borrow the language of civilian systems (‘sine causes’, ‘sans cause’, ‘ohne Rechtsgrund’), and civilian terminology can only do harm if it is imported without civilian substance.

Related Links

• http://www.answers.com/topic/void-contract
• http://www.lawreview.law.uwa.edu.au/law_review/contents/law_review_vol_23(2)
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Void_%28law%29
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Void_contract

An unenforceable contract or transaction is one that is valid, but which the court will not enforce. Unenforceable is usually used in contradistinction to void (or void ab initio) and voidable. If the parties perform the agreement, it will be valid, but the court will not compel them if they do not.

What are Unauthorized Contracts?

1. Those entered into in the name of another person by one, who has been given no authority or legal representation or who has acted beyond his powers;
2. Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds
3. Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.
   1. If only one party is incapable, this will fall under Voidable Contract under Article 1390, paragraph 1.

The case of Badillo vs. Ferrer, 152 SCRA 407

Article 1390 renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party’s consent is vitated by mistake, voilence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

Surviving widow has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in conveying to the vendees the undivided share of her minor children in the property, as her powers as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot include the power of disposition, and she should have first secured court approval before alienation of the property.

Since the minors never ratified the deed, and in fact questioned its validity, the contract remained unenforceable or unauthorized, and restitution by the minors as to the portion of the purchase price which pertains to their share is not legally sanctioned.

Statute of Frauds defined (Article 1403, paragraph 2)

Statute of Frauds requires that certain contracts be in writing, and that they be signed by all parties to be bound by the contract. Although there can be significant variation between jurisdictions, the most common types of contracts to which a statute of fraud applies is:

·        Contracts in consideration of marriage.

·        Contracts which cannot be performed within one year.

·        Contracts for the sale of an interest in land.

·        Contracts by the executor of a will to pay a debt of the estate with his own money.

·        Contracts for the sale of goods above a certain value.

·        Contracts in which one party becomes a surety (acts as guarantor) for another party’s debt or other obligation.

Law students often remember these circumstances by the mnemonic “MYLEGS” (marriage, year, land, executor, goods, surety).

The case of Diwa vs. Donato, 234 SCRA 608

It is settled that the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory and not to completed, executed or partially executed contracts. Thus as early as 1925, we held that where the land has been delivered under the oral contract of sale, and the vendees have already paid part of the purchase price, the heirs of the vendor cannot invoke the status of frauds in a proceeding where the vendees seek to have the land registered in their names.

Agreements for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable by action unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing and subscribed by the part charged or by his agent. Non-compliance with this provision, while not invalidating the contract which is not in writing, makes ineffective the action for specific performance.

How to satisfy the requirements?

Typically, to satisfy the requirements of the statute, the writing must identify the contracting parties, recite the subject matter of the contract such that it can reasonably be identified, and present the essential terms and conditions of the parties’ agreement. (Under the Uniform Commercial Code, to satisfy the statute, the writing for the sale of goods need only be signed by the party to be charged, and a quantity term.)

Please note that, even without respect to the Statute of Frauds, it is good practice to reduce the essential terms of any contract to a signed, written agreement. Even when a Statute of Frauds does not apply to an oral contract, it may be very difficult to prove and enforce the contract in the absence of a written agreement.

The purpose of Statute of Frauds

The purpose of a “statute of frauds” is, as the name suggests, to prevent injury from fraudulent conduct. There is some criticism of the continued existence of these statutes, as they are often used by parties who freely entered into fair contracts yet wish to avoid having to fulfill their agreements. At the same time, the abuses these statutes were designed to prevent are quite real, so a strong argument remains to keep them in place. It is also arguably good public policy to require that parties to certain significant transactions, such as those of long duration or which involve real estate, reduce their agreements to writing. Writing will both reduce the chance of future litigation, and also give the parties the opportunity to take a second look at the terms and conditions of their agreement before it becomes final.

The Effect of a Statute of Frauds

A statute of frauds does not of itself render a contract void. The statute makes certain contracts “voidable” by one of the parties, in the event that the party does not wish to follow through on the agreement. (A contract that is “void” cannot be enforced. A contract that is “voidable” remains valid unless one of the parties chooses to void the contract.)

Sometimes, a party to a contract that would otherwise be invalid under a “statute of frauds” will nonetheless be able to enforce it, on the basis of “partial performance” or “promissory estoppel”. Where “partial performance” exists, a party who has accepted partial performance by another party under the contract will typically be barred from asserting the “Statute of Frauds” in order to avoid meeting its own contractual obligations. “Promissory estoppel” exists where significant inequities (unfairness) would result from releasing a party from the contract, and the party seeking release knew or reasonably should have known that those inequities would be created at the time of the original agreement. For example, where the party which seeks to be released knew that the other party would incur significant expense in obtaining materials which cannot be transferred to other work, a court may find that under the circumstances the contract should be enforced despite the statute of frauds.

As previously noted, if all parties agree that they are bound by the contract, the contract will remain enforceable despite the statute of frauds.

Exceptions in applying Statute of Frauds

An agreement may be enforced even if it does not comply with the statute of frauds in the following situations:

·        Merchant’s Firm Offer, under the UCC. If one merchant sends a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds to another merchant, the merchant has reason to know of the contents of the sent confirmation and the receivor does not object to the confirmation within 10 days, the confirmation is good to satisfy the statute as to both parties.

·        Admission of the existence of a contract by the defendant under oath,

·        Part Performance of the contract. The agreement is enforceable up to the amount already paid, delivered, etc.

·        The goods were specially manufactured for the buyer and the seller either 1) began manufacturing them, or 2) entered into a third party contract for their manufacture, and the manufacturer cannot without undue burden sell the goods to another person in the seller’s ordinary course of business– for example, t-shirts with a baseball team logo or wall-to-wall carpeting for an odd-sized room.

Parole Evidence Rule defined

The parole evidence rule enacts a principle of the common law of contracts that presumes that a written contract embodies the complete agreement between the parties involved. The rule therefore generally forbids the introduction of extrinsic evidence (i.e., evidence of communications between the parties which is not contained in the language of the contract itself) which would change the terms of a later written contract.

In order for the rule to be effective, the contract in question must be an integrated writing; it must, in the judgment of the court, be the final agreement between the parties (as opposed to a mere draft, for example). One way to ensure that the contract will be found integration is through the inclusion of a merger clause, which recites that the contract is, in fact, the whole agreement between the parties. However, many modern cases have found merger clauses to be only a rebuttable presumption.

An integrated agreement is either a partial or complete integration. If it contains some, but not all, of the terms as to which the parties have agreed then it is a partial integration. This means that the writing was a final agreement between the parties (and not mere preliminary negotiations) as to some terms, but not as to others. On the other hand, if the writing were to contain all of the terms as to which the parties agreed, then it would be a complete integration. The importance of this distinction is relevant to what evidence is excluded under the parole evidence rule. For both complete and partial integrations, any evidence contradicting the writing is excluded under the parole evidence rule. However, for a partial integration, terms that do not contradict the writing but merely add to it are not excluded.

Exceptions in applying Parole Evidence Rule

There are a number of exceptions to the parole evidence rule. Extrinsic evidence can always be admitted for the following purposes:

·        To work out the subject matter of the contract.

·        To resolve an ambiguity in the contract.[1]

·        To show that an unambiguous term in the contract is in fact a mistaken transcription of a prior valid agreement. Such a claim must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and not merely by the preponderance of the evidence.

·        To show fraud, duress, mistake, or illegal purpose on the part of one or both parties.

·        To show that consideration has not actually been paid. For example, if the contract states that A has paid B $1,000 in exchange for a painting, B can introduce evidence that A had never actually conveyed the $1,000.

·        To identify the parties, especially if the parties have changed names.

·        To imply or incorporate a term of the contract.

In order for evidence to fall within this rule, it must involve either (1) a written or oral communication made prior to execution of the written contract; or (2) an oral communication made contemporaneous with execution of the written contract. Evidence of a later communication will not be barred by this rule, as it is admissible to show a later modification of the contract (although it might be inadmissible for some other reason, such as the Statute of Frauds. Similarly, evidence of a collateral agreement – one that would naturally and normally be included in a separate writing – will not be barred. For example, if A contracts with B to paint B’s house for $1,000, B can introduce extrinsic evidence to show that A also contracted to paint B’s storage shed for $100. The agreement to paint the shed would logically be in a separate document from the agreement to paint the house.

Though its name suggests that it is a procedural evidence rule, the consensus of courts and commentators is that the parole evidence rule constitutes substantive contract law.

Reference Links

·        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unenforceable

·        http://homepage.gallaudet.edu/Marshall.Wick/BUS447/unenforceable.html

·        http://www.textop.org/wiki/index.php?title=Unenforceable_contracts_and_contracts_in_the_state_of_nature

·        http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_frauds

·        http://www.expertlaw.com/library/business/statute_of_frauds.html

·        http://www.west.net/~smith/frauds.htm

“No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exervise and enjoyment of religious profession and whoship, without discrimniation or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be requires for the exercise of civil or political rights.”

Restriction by any law in exercising this right is prohibited by the Constitution itself.

Meaning of religion
According to Concise Oxford Dictionary, religion is the belief in and worship of a superhuman controlling power, especially a personal God or gods. a particular system of faith and worship. a pursuit or interest followed with devotion.

Aspects of religions freedom

1. The separation of Church and State
2. The freedom of religious profession and worship
   1. Freedom to believe in a religion
   2. Freedom to act in accordance with such belief

To believe and Act
Thus the (First) amendment embraces two concepts – freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be… In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same to action. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.

Justice Teenhankee says:

1. The right to freely exercise one’s religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. (footnote omitted) Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly “along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary – even more so than on the other departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.’ (J.B.L. Reyes, 125 SCRA at pp. 569-570)
2. In the free exercise of such preferred rights, there is to be no prior restraint although there may be subsequent punishment of any illegal acts committed during the exercise of such basic rights. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of these basic rights is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent (Idem, at pp. 560-561).

The establishment clause
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one’s chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. (footnote omitted). Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 L ed. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449)

Justice Laurel says:
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims . . . It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere toleration.

Establishment Clause versus Free Exercise Clause
Tension is also apparent when a case is decided to uphold the Free Exercise Clause and consequently exemptions from a law of general applicability are afforded by the Court to the person claiming religious freedom; the question arises whether the exemption does not amount to support of the religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. This was the case in the Free Exercise Clause case of Sherbert where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, viz:

In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the “establishment” of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.371 (emphasis supplied)

Tension also exists when a law of general application provides exemption in order to uphold free exercise as in the Walz case where the appellant argued that the exemption granted to religious organizations, in effect, required him to contribute to religious bodies in violation of the Establishment Clause. But the Court held that the exemption was not a case of establishing religion but merely upholding the Free Exercise Clause by “sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on private profit institutions.

How the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause will be resolved is a question for determination in the actual cases that come to the Court. In cases involving both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, the two clauses should be balanced against each other. The courts must review all the relevant facts and determine whether there is a sufficiently strong free exercise right that should prevail over the Establishment Clause problem. In the United States, it has been proposed that in balancing, the free exercise claim must be given an edge not only because of abundant historical evidence in the colonial and early national period of the United States that the free exercise principle long antedated any broad-based support of disestablishment, but also because an Establishment Clause concern raised by merely accommodating a citizen’s free exercise of religion seems far less dangerous to the republic than pure establishment cases. Each time the courts side with the Establishment Clause in cases involving tension between the two religion clauses, the courts convey a message of hostility to the religion that in that case cannot be freely exercised.374 American professor of constitutional law, Laurence Tribe, similarly suggests that the free exercise principle “should be dominant in any conflict with the anti-establishment principle.” This dominance would be the result of commitment to religious tolerance instead of “thwarting at all costs even the faintest appearance of establishment.”375 In our jurisdiction, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. asserts that a literal interpretation of the religion clauses does not suffice. Modern society is characterized by the expanding regulatory arm of government that reaches a variety of areas of human conduct and an expanding concept of religion. To adequately meet the demands of this modern society, the societal values the religion clauses are intended to protect must be considered in their interpretation and resolution of the tension. This, in fact, has been the approach followed by the Philippine Courts.

Religious Devotion
Anent the representation that attendance to religious devotion is not a “cut” in public service alleging that people of Muslim faith can accomplish many good deeds outside office such as promotion of unity, peace and understanding among the people must similarly be rejected. The theory is that a religious belief by itself cannot in any degree affect public interest (Textbook on the Philippine Constitution, Hector SCRA De Leon, 1991 Edition). The promotion of unity, peace and understanding is a right accompanying the right to religion as it partakes the form of the right to dissemination of belief. Additionally, the exercise of religious profession and worship is obviously alien to performance of work considering that the former is a cleric activity and the latter is secular one.

Freedom not to associate
(Republic Act No. 3350) was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. . . . The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs, and . . . eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment.

A fundamental personal right and liberty
Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty (Schneider v. Irgington, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 84 L.ed.155, 164, 60 S.Ct. 146) and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary.

Right, not absolute
More importantly, the right to act in accordance with one’s belief is not and cannot be absolute. Conduct remains subject to regulation and even prohibition for the protection of society (Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U.SCRA 296). It may not be used to justify an action or refusal inconsistent with general welfare of society (People vs. Diel, [CA] 44 O.G. 590, August 22, 1947). One of the regulations imposed in its exercise is the compliance of government employees to Section 5 of the Omnibus Rules relative to the number of working hours. While government employees of Muslim faith are excused from work between the hours of 10 o’clock in the morning up to 2 o’clock in the afternoon every Friday, they are obligated to compensate said lost working hours by adopting flexible time schedule to complete forty hours of work in a week.

Church versus State
We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah’s Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a ‘small portion of the school population’ will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation ‘untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes’ (Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 224). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of ‘patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation of national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values’ (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court has feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.

Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, x x x- assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion- is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.

It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some ‘compelling state interest’ intervenes.

Related Cases

• Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2
• Everson vs. Board of Education, 330 U. SCRA 1
• West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U. SCRA 624
• Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, March 1, 1993
• Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201
• Centeno vs. Villalon, 236 SCRA 197
• Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. SCRA 569
• Fonacier vs. CA, 96 Phil. 417
• Garces vs. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510
• German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514
• Gonzales vs. Archbishop of Manila, 51 Phil. 420
• Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc. vs. CA, July 26, 1996
• Marsh vs. State of Alabama, 326 U. SCRA 501
• Pamil vs. Teleron, 86 SCRA 413
• People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
• School District of Abington Township, Pa. vs. Schempp, 374 U. SCRA 203
• Engle vs. Vitale, 370 U.SCRA 421; 8 L. ed. 2d. 601
• Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
• Zorach vs. Clauson, 343 U. SCRA 306
• Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310 U. SCRA 296
• Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 657
• Pastor Dionisio V. Austria vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999
• Estrada vs. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

External Resources and Credits

• Textbook on the Philippine Constitution by Hector S. De Leon
• International Center of Law and Religious Studies – http://www.iclrs.org/
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_religion
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_of_church_and_state
• http://www.csc.gov.ph/mread02/res-020720.html