Case Digests Request

We eat cases for breakfast!

We eat cases for breakfast!

If you have a certain case you want us to digest, simply tell us any of the information below and we will try our best to assist you further with your research.

  • Case Title:
  • PHIL or SCRA Volume and Page:
  • GR Number (optional):
  • Subject:
  • Topic:
  • Online Decision URL (in raw format; recommended):

If there are other request below which has not been finished, feel free to help us by being a contributor! (the more, the merrier ^^)

NOTE: Allow us at least 4-7 days before we can complete your request. If you have a high volume of cases to be digested, post your syllabus instead by being our contributor so you can have access to our dashboard.

12 responses to “Case Digests Request

  1. Case digest of
    Agbayani vs. Sayo, Arturo Borjal & Maximo Sulliven vs. CA & Francisco Wenceslao and Gaudencio Antonino vs. Brigido Valencia.
    only their Facts, issues, and the rulings. pls😦

  2. hello,pahelp naman po case digest of
    1. cook vs. mcmicking, 27 phil.10
    2. deleon vs. salvador, 36 scra 567
    3. kavanera vs. imperial 79 scra 111..tnx a lot!

    • NELLIE LOUISE COOK vs. J. MCMICKING, sheriff of Manila

      Facts:

      On August 8, 1912, an injunction was granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila restraining the sale of certain property levied upon under an execution issued upon a judgment rendered on April 30 by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal in the case of Johnson et al. vs. Edward Cook.

      The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is the wife of Edward Cook; that she is the absolute owner of a piece of square meters in area, and that the same is registered in her name under the Torrens Law by certificate No. 130; that on the 15th of June 1912, a judgment was entered against Edward Cook, plaintiff’s husband, for the sum of P10,000 in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal; that by virtue of said judgment an execution was issued on the 10th of July of that year and levied upon the land described in the complaint as belonging to the plaintiff and that the same was advertised for sale on the 8th of August at 9 o’ clock in the morning. After other allegations appropriate to an action of this kind, plaintiff prays from an junction permanently prohibiting the defendants from selling the said land.

      The Torrens title introduced in evidence by the plaintiff was obtained in June 1904 in the name of plaintiff’s husband, Edward Cook. Later, and sometime in August of the same year, the husband, by an intrusment in writing in the form and manner required by Act No. 496, transferred to the plaintiff the land in question. In 1911 the plaintiff’s husband Edward Cook, became indebted to Johnson, the plaintiff in the action referred to, in the sum of P10,000, the purchase price of certain lands. Judgement upon said indebtedness was procured in the year 1912 as aforesaid and a levy made upon the lands described in the complaint.

      It is claimed by the appellants that the so-called transfer from plaintiff’s husband to her was completely void under article 1458 of the Civil Code and that, therefore, the property still remains the property of Edward Cook and subject to levy under execution against him.

      Issue:

      Whether or not the claim by the appellants that the so-called transfer from plaintiff’s husband to her was completely void under article 1458 of the Civil Code and that, therefore, the property still remains the property of Edward Cook and subject to levy under execution against him?

      Ruling:

      In our opinion the position taken by appellants is untenable. They are not in the position the challenge the validity of the transfer, if it may be called such. They bore absolutely no relation to the parties to the transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or interest inchoate, present, remote, or otherwise, in the property in question at the time the transfer occurred. Although certain transfers from husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in the article referred to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only two person who bear such a relation to the parties making the transfer with their rights or interest. Unless such a relationship appears the transfer cannot be attacked.

      So far as the record of this case demonstrates the property in question is owned by the plaintiff and is not subject to levy and sale under the execution in this case.

      The judgment appealed from affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

    • AURORA P. DE LEON vs. HONORABLE JUDGE FERNANDO CRUZ of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, Branch XII

      Facts:

      The Court herein reiterates the rule that in the absence of overriding considerations, the judgment debtor will not be granted preliminary injunction to enjoin execution of a final judgment or implementation of an already executed judgment simply because of the filing by the judgment debtor of a new action for annulment of the executed judgment on bare allegations of fraud, because the presumption is that such judgment was legally and validly rendered.

      On December 28, 1970, this Court rendered its joint decision in Cases L-30871 1 and L-31603 2 involving the same protagonists at bar, wherein the decisive issue of conflict of jurisdiction between two branches of the Caloocan City court of first instance was stated thus:

      The Court sustained the exclusive jurisdiction of Judge Cruz’s court, holding that “(I)t is patent that such exclusive jurisdiction was vested in Judge Cruz’ court.

      This Court thus upheld the validity of the execution sale held on February 14, 1967 of respondent Bernabe’s two real properties (registered under T.C.T. Nos. 94985 and 94986 of Caloocan City) wherein petitioner Aurora de Leon (sister of the judgment creditor Enrique de Leon) was the highest bidder and of Judge Cruz’ orders of September 5, 1969 and January 5, 1970 in the first case (No. C-189) consolidating ownership of the properties in petitioner de Leon with the expiration of the redemption period and ordering respondent to surrender his owner’s duplicate certificates of title to the properties thus sold to petitioner “since said orders were within the exclusive competence and jurisdiction of Judge Cruz’ court.”

      By the same token, this Court held that Judge Salvador had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent Bernabe’s second action (Case No. C-1217) against his judgment creditor Enrique de Leon and herein petitioner Aurora P. de Leon as purchaser to set aside or annul the execution on February 14, 1967 “for being anomalous and irregular” and to order the holding of a new auction sale.

      Pursuant to this Court’s said decision, petitioner assumed control of the properties and collection of the rentals therefrom, while under the Court’s resolution of March 15, 1971, Bernabe’s motion for the return of the redemption amount of P33,817.28 accepted by the sheriff under Judge Salvador’s order of May 20, 1969 which this Court set aside and declared null and void, was granted as a matter of equity.

      It now turns out that respondent Bernabe filed under the same date of March 15, 1971 still another action against petitioner Aurora P. de Leon, et al. (docketed as Case No. C-2048) for annulment or declaration of nullity of the judgment rendered against him in the first case (No. C-189) at the execution sale of which petitioner de Leon had acquired his properties in question on the ground that “the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. C-189 which led to the execution and sale of his properties, was null and void because the same was secured by Enrique de Leon, Jr., petitioner’s brother and the plaintiff named in Civil Case No. C-189, through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in that his (Enrique de Leon, Jr.’) signatures appearing in the document (lease contract) on which his complaint in Civil Case No. C-189 was founded, and in the verification of said complaint, were both falsified by his father, Enrique de Leon, Jr. is not entitled to the judgment he obtained in Civil Case No. C-189 because the complaint which gave rise to it was not instituted by him but by his father, Enrique de Leon, Sr. — the person who signed the verification thereof declaring that he is the plaintiff named therein.”

      When petitioner asked respondent judge to finally enforce his previous orders of September 5, 1969 and January 5, 1970 for the surrender and cancellation of respondent Bernabe’s certificates of title and the issuance of new certificates in petitioner’s favor (as upheld by this Court’s previous decision above referred to), respondent judge denied petitioner’s motions to this effect per his orders of June 11, 1971 and September 8, 1971 on the ground of pendency of respondents’ new action for annulment of judgment (Case No.
      C-2048).

      Hence, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. 12 The Court, in giving due course, issued on January 15, 1972 its writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents from further restraining this Court’s final decision in Cases L-30871 and L-31603 above referred to and respondent judge from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with the annulment case (No. C-2048).

      Issue:

      The crucial issue thus presented at bar is whether respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing his challenged orders restraining in effect implementation of this Court’s final decision of December 28, 1970 which sustained his own orders of September 5, 1969 and January 5, 1970 in the original case (No. C-189) “confirming Aurora’s acquisition of title to the properties by virtue of the execution sale and ordering Bernabe to transfer possession to her” 13 simply from the bare fact that respondent Bernabe has filed on March 15, 1971 a second action for annulment of the executed judgment for alleged fraud (Case No. C-2048) after his first action for annulment of the execution sale in favor of petitioner Aurora (Case No. C-1217) had failed and this Court had sustained by final judgment the very orders implementing the execution sale which respondent judge would now enjoin?

      Ruling:

      The Court holds that respondent judge did so act with grave abuse of discretion. In the absence of overriding considerations — and none has been shown here — the implementation of execution proceedings already performed in satisfaction of a judgment and sustained by final judgment of this Court (for consolidation of title of the properties acquired in the execution sale by petitioner Aurora and her exercise of the rights of ownership and possession the same) will not be enjoined, simply because of the filing by the judgment debtor of a new action for annulment of the executed judgment on the ground of fraud, because the presumption is that such judgment was legally and validly rendered. This is doubly true where as in this case respondent judgment debtor has already failed in a previous action to annul the execution sale and this Court sustained the validity of such sale in a final judgment rendered over three years ago on December 28, 1970.

      Equally pertinent is the established doctrine that where there is no question about the jurisdiction of the court over the parties and subject matter and the proceedings were free from extrinsic fraud, the judgment cannot be declared null and void even if it were assumed that the court committed an error of judgment or reached an erroneous conclusion in deciding the case, since such errors of judgment — not of jurisdiction are correctible and reviewable only by appeal and “if no appeal is taken, the decision, erroneous or not, becomes final and executory, and is valid and binding between the parties.” 16

      Thus, when respondent judge in obedience to this Court’s preliminary injunction subsequently ordered respondent Bernabe to surrender his titles under pain of cancellation and authorized petitioner Aurora “to resume collecting rentals from the properties” per his orders of April 7, 1972, July 1, 1972 and September 11, 1972 and Bernabe sought to impugn such orders in a petition for certiorari filed with this Court on September 28, 1972 (docketed as Case L-35559 17) the Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit per its resolutions of October 31, 1972 and November 28, 1972.

      Here, respondent Bernabe admittedly had his day in Court in the original case (No. C-189) where judgment was obtained and executed against him, his appeal from the judgment failed, and his special civil action for certiorari again Judge Cruz’ orders confirming petitioner Aurora’s acquisition of title to the properties by virtue of the execution sale was decided adversely against him in this Court’s decision of December 28, 1970.

      He now alleges fraud in his new complaint only in the judgment creditor’s father (Enrique de Leon, Sr.) allegedly falsified his (the son’s) signatures in the lease contract and in the complaint supra. 18 In respondent Bernabe’s belated supplementary memorandum of May 19, 1973, however, realizing perhaps that his bare allegations as to the father having falsified the signatures of his son, the judgment creditor, in the lease contract and the complaint do not make out a case of extrinsic fraud since he was no way deprived of his day in court, he now makes for the first time allegations not made below of a “second fraud” alleged collusion between his lawyer in the first case (C-189) and the de Leons and indicates that he would correspondingly seek an “amendment of pleading if necessary to serve the ends of justice.”

      The best-case view for respondent then is that while he could file such action or amended action for annulment of the executed judgment (on the assumption that his first action to annul the execution sale in Case No. 1217 is not res judicata) such filing per se does not invalidate the judgment nor entitle him to a preliminary injunction suspending effects and consequences of the executed judgment to prejudice of petitioner Aurora, whose rights as purchaser of the properties at the execution sale have been recognized by this Court’s final judgment of December 28, 1970, until and unless he shall have obtained a final judgment for annulment.

      The worst-case view for respondent is that respondent judge may take a second look at petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action on the ground that the fraud alleged in respondent’s new complaint does not constitute extrinsic fraud — which alone warrants annulment of a judgment — and then resolve after hearing the parties that indeed no extrinsic fraud is alleged in respondent’s second complaint for annulment or such amendments thereof as shall have been permitted and that the same should therefore be dismissed without need of trial for failure to state a cause of action.

      The question of extrinsic fraud has been extensively discussed in the Court’s ample jurisprudence on the matter. In the latest case of Cruz vs. Navarro, 19 Mr. Justice Castro succinctly defined fraud as “extrinsic when it is employed to deprive a party of his day in court, thereby preventing him from asserting his right to the property.”

      ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is granted and respondent judge’s questioned orders of June 11, 1971 and September 8, 1971 in Case No. C-189 denying implementation of his previous orders confirming petitioner’s acquisition of title to the properties (as set aside by respondent judge in his subsequent orders of April 7, July 1, and September 11, 1972) are hereby set aside and annulled. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued on January 15, 1972 by the Court is set aside insofar as it enjoined respondent judge from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with the annulment case (No. C-2048) with instructions to dispose of the same, particularly as to the unresolved question raised in petitioner’s pending motion to dismiss of whether the allegations of respondent’s complaint therein make out a case of extrinsic fraud so as to state a cause of action, in consonance with the controlling principles and jurisprudence thereon as set forth in the Court’s opinion. No pronouncement as to costs.

  3. SIR good day ,–.Im having a hard time digesting this case😦 I am a working student. can you lend me some help for this cases in SALES gr. no 156055 rr paredes vs calilung, GR no. 158676 BPI family savings,gr no. 165285, gr no. 148596 JL investment.

Share your opinion

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Palitan )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Palitan )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Palitan )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Palitan )

Connecting to %s